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EMPIRICAL METHODS OF IDENTIFYING AND
MEASURING MARKET POWER
JONATHAN B. BAKER*
TIMOTHY F. BRESNAHAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past decade academic economists have developed a variety
of approaches using economic methodologies to measure market power.
These approaches are based on observing the way a firm's or industry's
price and output respond to changes in the economic environnent.-
Some of these econometric methods make inferences about market
power from a firm's or industry's response to variation in cost. Others
make such inferences from a firm's or industry's response to variation in
the elasticity of demand, or by detecting multiple pricing regimes.
Measuring market power is important because antitrust law protects
competition in order to deter or correct the exercise of such power,
whether by a monopolist or by firms acting collectively. From an economic
perspective, a firm (or group of firms acting collectively) possesses market
power if the entity is able profitably to raise price by reducing output.'
To infer the existence and magnitude of market power, antitrust today
relies routinely on market share and market concentration evidence.
Accounting measures of markup or profits have also been employed in
this task. These existing methodologies are far from perfect, however.
This article describes some of the econometric methods developed to
measure market power. To the extent these new approaches can be used
* Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis,
Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Juostice, and Professor of Economics, Stanford
University, respectively. The views expressed in this article are not necessarily those of tile
U.S. Department of justice. The author-S are itidebted to janUsz A. Ordover.
Econometrics applies statistical methods to meastire the real world magnitude Of the
concepts employed by economic theory.
2 In the last decade, these methods have become standard in the economics literatt re.
For a technical survey, see Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Studies (#'Industries with Alarket
Power, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL OR;ANIZATION 10 11-57 (Richard Schmalensee &
Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
: William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Atltitrust Cases, 94 11ARv. L.
REV. 937 (1981).
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by courts and enforcers to cross-check the conclusions reached through
a traditional methodology, they promise to increase the precision of the
market power inferences likely to emerge in an adversarial setting.
II. TRADITIONAL METHODS OF MEASURING
MARKET POWER
Antitrust law's primary current methodology for identifying market
power infers power from market concentration. In a properly defined
market, a firm with a high market share is often thought to have market
power, and a concentrated industry is often thought susceptible to the
collective exercise of market power. This inference may not be correct,
however, for many reasons including the following three. First, if entry
into a market is easy, no firm can exercise market power, no matter how
large its market share. Second, a firm could have a large market share
and the market could appear concentrated, not because the firm has
market power but because it has low costs or sells superior products.'
Finally, market definition treats each substitute product as either inside
the market or outside the market. This approach does not recognize the
competitive discipline exerted by those products just outside the market
on the products within, and it does not recognize differences in degree
to which firms selling within the market constrain each other.
Because antitrust recognizes these problems with inferring market
power from market concentration, the analysis of market power under
the traditional approach does not stop with market share. Other informa-
tion is employed to adjust the inference about market power made from
shares. While this analytic process is a familiar one, especially in merger
analysis where it is guided by the Merger Guidelines promulgated by the
federal antitrust enforcement agencies," it is hard to be confident that
these adjustments solve all the problems with the traditional approach.
These analytic difficulties are heightened by the adversarial setting in
which market power inferences are typically made in antitrust practice.
Litigants first contest market definition, the primary basis for the compu-
tation of market share. Then they dispute the inferences about market
power that can reasonably be made from concentration in light of, for
example, entry conditions or aspects of industry structure that make
coordinated behavior more or less plausible. Even when the traditional
'More generally, the economic literature today treats concentration as much the result
of the way firms have chosen to invest and interact (including their exercise of market
power), than as a cause or indicator of the potential exercise of market power.
5 U.S. Department of'Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines (April 2, 1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 [hereinafter 1992
Merger Guidelines].
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analytic methodology for assessing market power has been carefully
elaborated, as in the Merger Guidelines, the substantial room remaining
for good faith disputes as to its application highlights the imprecision of
the approach.
Antitrust law has, at times, also employed accounting profits or mark-
ups as an indicator of market power.'  But this methodology is also far
from ideal. For example, high profits or margins might reflect efficienc-
ies, such as low costs or superior product design, rather than market
power. In addition, the way accountants spread costs over time and adjust
asset values for depreciation frequently causes accounting measures of
profit to bear little relation to those underlying economic concepts that
might in principle be related to market power. These problems loom so
large that antitrust today does not rely heavily on profitability measures
in making inferences about market power.
III. NEW ECONOMETRIC METHODS OF MEASURING
MARKET POWER
Econometric techniques for measuring market power can be divided
into three classes, each based on a different conceptual experiment.
The basic approach of each class of methodologies will be described by
sketching the conceptual experiment that underlies one approach in each
class. 7 By explaining why the new methods identify market power in
principle, this article seeks to help antitrust lawyers evaluate the choice
of econometric methodology adopted by an economic expert.'
A. EMPIRICAL METHODS BASED ON RESPONSES
TO VARIATION IN COST
The first class of empirical methods for identifying market power is
based on observing the way firms and industries respond to variation in
For a description of the historical use of accounting data on profits for inferring
market power, see Kenneth Elzinga, Uaitms king Moiopoly: Four /l)wp of Economic Evideice, in
ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST POLICY II (Robert J. Larner & James W. Meehan, jr. eds.,
1989).
'The references in the notes will identify representative technical articles describing
related methodologies.
This article focuses on helping lawyers, enforcers, andjudges determine whether the
empirical approach chosen is appropriate to the industry studied, and suitable for ad-
dressing the legal question for which the technique's results are offered. This article (toes
not address the complementary topic of whether the expert economist has correctly isolated
the application of the desired conceptual experiment in the data (that is, the important
question of how to undertake statistical inference once a methodological approach has been
chosen).
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marginal cost. The present discussion emphasizes one important tool in
the class: residual demand estimation.")
The following anecdote will suggest the way residual demand estima-
tion identifies market power."' The marketing manager of a firm selling
a branded consumer product, termed for convenience firm A, was once
asked, "Have you ever raised your product's price in one metropolitan
area, and discovered that no rival firm went along?" He responded, "That
happened once in Chicago, where we had a large market share. When
we raised our price, none of our rivals followed. We lost a great deal of
market share immediately, and were forced to rescind the price increase."
This anecdote suggests that in Chicago at the time of that incident,
firm A did not have power over price acting unilaterally. It could not
profitably increase price by reducing its own output because it lost so
many sales as to make the price increase unprofitable. Even though the
firm had a large market share, it did not possess market power in the
sense of the economists' definition.
The marketing manager was then asked, "When you lost market share,
which rival benefited?" He responded, "Rivals B and C gained share, but
rivals D and E did not." This observation suggests that firms B and C
constrained the original firm's pricing, while firms D and E did not. The
story provides anecdotal evidence that the merger of firm A with firm D
or E likely would not permit the unilateral exercise of market power by
A." I
Although this story is no more than an anecdote, a saying attributed
to George Stigler has it that the plural of anecdote is data. '2 The anecdote
suggests one way to proceed to obtain systematic statistical evidence on
the presence of market power. One could imagine identifying a large
number of situations in which firm A had an incentive to change its price
unilaterally, but no rival firm had an incentive to alter price except
perhaps in response to what firm A did. It would then be possible to
determine whether firm A successfully raised price systematically in such
For examples of statistical tools other than residoal demand estimation for identifying
inarket power that rely on the experiment of observing the response of firms to "cost
shocks," see John C. Panzar & James N. Rosse, Testingfor "Monopoly" Equilibrium, 35 J.
INnus. ECON. 443 (1987); Orley Ashenfelter & Daniel Sullivan, Nonpammetric Tests oj'Market
Structure: An Application to the Cigarette Industry, 35.J. INDUS. EcON. 483 (1987).
"' This anecdote is taken from the authors' experience in reviewing a proposed merger
on behalf of the acquiring firm.
" The unilateral exercise of market power is one potential adverse competitive effect
resulting from merger. See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, § 2.21.
12 Ernst Berndt attributes this saying to George Stigler in ERNST BERNOT, THE PRACTICE
OF ECONOMETRICS: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY, inside front cover (1991).
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situations. This conceptual experiment is performed by residual demand
estimation. '3 The residual demand elasticity measures the extent to which
a firm would be able to raise price by reducing output, after taking into
account the demand responses of buyers and the supply responses of
rivals. '
It is also possible to determine whether some specific rival, such as
firm D, provided on average a significant constraint on firm A's behavior.
This experiment is performed by estimating a partial residual demand
function.15 The partial residual demand elasticity measures the extent to
which a particular rival constrains the ability of a given firm to exercise
market power. This information is relevant to determining whether a
merger between sellers of differentiated products would permit the
merged firm to exercise market power unilaterally.
The primary statistical problem confronting econometricians at-
tempting to estimate residual demand functions is isolating the individual
moments-the many anecdotes in the data-at which firm A alone had an
incentive to raise price. The solution to this problem involves identifying
variables that shifted firm A's costs without altering the costs of any other
firm in its industry."' By isolating situations in which firm A's costs rose,
while no other firm's costs changed, the econometric technique collects
situations in which firm A had an incentive to alter price alone, permitting
a systematic examination of whether it could successfully do so. If firm
A has power over price, it will raise price (although not necessarily by the
full amount of the cost increase). But if the firm recognizes that it would
lose too much business to its rivals were it to raise price (whether because
the products of its rivals are too close demand substitutes or because its
rivals would respond too aggressively in competition), and thus if the
firm chooses not to raise price despite the increase in its costs, then the
firm does not have market power. Moreover, when firm A loses sales, if
firm B is systematically a major beneficiary, then it is reasonable to con-
clude that firm B plays an important role constraining the potential
exercise of market power by firm A.
3:Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Estimating the Residual Demand Curve
Facing a Single Fi~ra, 6 INT'L .J. INDUS. ORG. 283 (1988). For an application to identifying
monopsony power, see Daniel SuIllivan, Mo11tpsolty Power ill the MarkettJtr Nnurses, 32] ..L. &
ECON. S135 (No. 2, Pt. 2 1989).
" This market power is available to the firm even if it does not take full advantage of it;
in this sense, the market power revealed h) resildttal demand estimation is "potential"
market power.
'-Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, ThG ;ains fto Mer get ar Collusion ilt
Product-Differentiated ndiutries, 33 J. INoUS. ECON. 427 (1985).
" In the econometric jargon, these variables are the "instrtonlenlts" that "identify" the
residual dlemand function in a simultaneous equation settittg.
1992]
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The cost-variation experiment that identifies market power under the
residual demand methodology raises a particular firm's costs without
raising the costs of its rivals. This experiment induces the firm to exercise
power over price ifit can, permitting the measurement of market power.
No small part of the applied econometrician's art involves identifying
situations in which an individual firm's costs have increased while no
other firm's costs have changed. In one residual demand study of the
brewing industry during the 1970s, 7 for example, three variables were
employed. First, each firm's costs were thought to depend in part upon
a variable related to firm-wide capacity utilization, on the view that firm
marginal costs were the lowest when excess capacity was the greatest.
Second, changes in the wage rate for brewery workers in Colorado not
reflected in the wage rate for the United States as a whole affected the
marginal cost of production for Coors, but not the costs of any other
brewer. Finally, for multiproduct brewers, average capacity of all firms'
plants was thought to be related to the exploitation of plant-level scale
econoties, and thus to marginal cost.
The empirical methodology of residual demand estimation, developed
for identifying the market power of a single firm, has also been applied
to define markets." The experiment proposed by this application raises
cost simLultaneously for all the firms selling in the proposed market-
for example, all the manufacturers of carbonated soft drinks-without
raising costs for firms selling possible demand substitutes excluded from
the proposed market, such as juice, coffee, milk and other beverages.' '
If the soft drink producers collectively would respond to a soft drink
industry cost increase by raising price, despite the threat of lost sales to
the producers of other beverages, it is likely that a soft drink cartel would
raise price'( and, thus, likely that soft drinks form a product market.2'
Although the 1992 Merger Guidelines propose a different experiment
for defining markets than the estimation of the residual demand elasticity
'7 Baker & Bresnahan, supra note 13.
8 David r. Scheffnman & Pablo T. Spiller, Geographic Market Definition Under the U.S.
Department q justice Merger Guidelines, 30J. L. & EcoN. 123 (1987). See aso jonathan B. Baker,
Why Price Correlations Do Not Define Antitrust Markets: On Econometric Algorithms for
Market Definition (Working Paper No. 149, FTC Bureau of Economics 1987).
"Althoutgh a product market definition example has been chosen, the methodology
applies equally to geographic market definition.
21 A cartel would find it profitable to raise price if soft drink demand is more inelastic
than some threshold level. The relevant threshold elasticity will depend upon existing
price-cost margins.
' The application of residLial demand estimation to market definition makes clear that
residLal demand elasticities identify potential market power, not necessarily fully exercised,
as dfiscussed above in note 14.
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for an aggregate of products and geographic locations, this elasticity
remains relevant to the ultimate question of measuring market power,
toward which market definition is aimed. 2
An example from academic research of' the application of' residual
demand estimation suggests the value to antitrust of' developing new
methodologies for measuring market power. In the brewing industry in
the 1970s, measures of market power based upon market share did not
strongly distinguish Pabst and Coors. These two brewers had comparable
national market shares, and each had high market shares in certain
regions of the country (the mountain states for Coors, and the ipper
Midwest for Pabst).
Perhaps a careful application of the traditional methodology of infer-
ring market power from market share would have identified significant
differences between the competitive role played by these firms (from
which differences in market power would be suggested), but any such
distinctions would likely have been strongly contested in an adversarial
proceeding. Yet application of the residual demand methodology re-
vealed that Coors possessed a great deal of market power, most likely
because of its unique product niche, while Pabst possessed little market
power.": The advantage to antitrust enforcers and judges of employing
more than one approach to identifying market power is evident.
B. EMPIRICAL METHODS BASED ON RESPONSES -0
VARIATION IN TlE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
The second class of statistical tools relies on the idea that a firm (or
group of firms) exercising market power will raise price the most above
cost at times or in markets in which buyers do not have good demand
'2 The 1992 Merger Guidelines require that iarket definition be performed while "as-
suming the terms of sale of all other products are held constant." 1992 Merger Guidelines,
supra note 5, at § 1.0. This assumption suggests that market definition proceed through the
estimation of a structural rather than a residual demand elasticity for a group of products
and locations. A structural demand elasticity (the familiar "own-price elasticity" frtom
microeconomic theory) accounts for the role of dlemaind substitution in limiting the exercise
of market power, but, utlike the residual demand elasticity, the Structlral demand elasticity
does not also account for the competitive or cooperative responses of the rivals selling
demand substitutes. The 1992 Merger Guidelines account for the responses oft rivals in
assessing the competitive effects of mergers rather than in market definition. Accordingly,
when the two elasticities differ significantly (because supply responses of firms outside the
proposed market strongly affect the behavior of firns within the market), the structural
demand elasticity is the more relevant for defining markets under the Merger Guidelines
methodology, but the residual demand elasticity is the more relevant for directly assessing
the combined influence of demand and supply substitution on the potential exercise of
market power. As with residual demand elasticity estimation, instrumental variable tech-
niques are employed to estimate a structural demand elasticity.
2 Baker & Bresnahan, supra note 13.
19921
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substitutes. More technically, for a firm exercising market power, the
percentage markup of price over marginal cost will be the greatest when
demand is the most inelastic.
The significance of the market demand elasticity in discriminating
between firms that are exercising market power and those that are not
can be indicated by an example. Suppose that most aluminum buyers
would readily switch to steel in the event of a small rise in the price of
aluminum above the competitive price. Here the market demand for
aluminum is highly elastic. Under such circumstances, it does not matter
to the performance of the aluminum industry how few or how many
sellers of aluminum compete. Even an aluminum monopolist would find
itself constrained by the threat of buyer substitution, and would refrain
from raising price above the competitive level.
The point is a general one: when industry demand is highly elastic,
firms with market power behave similarly to those without market power.
In contrast, if steel is not a close demand substitute for most buyers of
aluminum at current aluminum prices, so that the market demand is not
highly elastic, then there is room for the aluminum sellers to exercise
market power if they possess it. In such a situation, firms with market
power will behave differently (by charging higher prices) than firms that
lack such power. '
In an industry in which demand is not highly elastic, it would be
possible in principle to detect the exercise of market power directly if the
competitive price or competitive industry output were observable. Firms
charging higher than the competitive price, or an industry selling less
than the competitive output, would be exercising power over price. Un-
fortunately, it is rarely if ever possible to know what the competitive
equilibrium would look like. The main problem is determining marginal
cost with precision from accounting data, according to an economist's
definition of marginal cost. Instead, it is necessary to infer market power
from those experiments performed by history which distinguish firms
exercising market power from those that do not. The idea that the
industry demand elasticity constrains the exercise of market power pro-
vides the basis for a second class of empirical methodologies for identi-
fying and measuring market power.15
2'Another remark attributed to George Stigler is that price discrimination (in the econo-
mists' sense) is the best evidence of the presence of narket power. Empirical approaches
to identifying market power based on responses to variation in the demand elasticity can
be thought of as generalizing this remark.
'-5 Representative studies inferring market power frtom response to variation in the elastic-
ity of demand inciude: Timothy F. Bresnahan & Valerie Y. Suslow, Oligopoly Pricing with
Capacity Constraints, 15/16 ANNALES D'ECONOMIE El DE SrATrISTIQUL. 267 (1989) (honoge-
neous pI0duct industry); Tinothy F. Bresnahan, Competition and Collusion in the American
[Vol. 61
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To see how this approach works, suppose that the aluminum industry's
costs neither vary with the volume produced (constant returns to scale)
nor change over time (presumably because input prices and the produc-
tion technology do not change). Suppose further that in the recent past,
the price of steel, a demand substitute, increased. After the steel price
rise, more aluminum users than before have no close substitutes. The
demand for aluminum increases at every aluminim price and, most
likely, aluminum demand becomes more inelastic.2 6 As a result, the po-
tential gains to the exercise of market power will rise.
This hypothetical example provides an experiment that will reveal
whether the aluminum industry exercises market powver.2 7 If the alumi-
num industry is competitive, the reduced elasticity of aluminum demand
will not affect the price of aluminum. Competition will keep price at the
competitive level, close to cost,2 even though the potential gains to the
exercise of market power have Increased. But if the firms in the industry
are able to exercise market power, they will take advantage of the reduc-
tion in the demand elasticity to raise price further. 2 ' Here an industry
exercising market power is distinguished from one that is not exercising
market power by observing industry response to variation in the elasticity
of market demand.5
Automobile Industrv: The 1955 Price Wa?, 35 J. INDus. ECON. 457 (1987) (differentiated
product industry); Matthew D. Gelfand & Pablo T. Spiller, Entry Barriers and Moltipodct
Oligopolies, 5 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 101 (1987) (differentiated product industIry); Steven
T. Berry, Airport Presence as Product DifIirentiatio,,, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 394 (Papers and
Proceedings, May 1990) (differentiated plodtLct indLIstry); Valerie Y. Suslow, Estimating
Monopoly Behavior with Competitive Recclitg: An Appl/ication to Alcoa, 17 RA,,D J. E oN. 389
(1986) (dominant firm).
26 The asstm ption that the demand fot ,tl tturiInU becnines niore inelastic is ta tanIot nt
to assuming that the detmand for aluminuit increases more at high altminU prices than
at low aluiiintum prices.
27 This example is based upon Bresnlhan & SuslowV, supa note 24. In theit article,
Bresnahan and Suslow employ butsiness cycle fluctuations rathtr than variation in the price
of a demand substitute as the primary source of itertetnporal Variation in the elasticity of
demand for alumiium.
28 Were returns to scale decreasing (rising marginal cost), the cotipeititive price would
equal narginal cost. With constant returns io scale, the price in free-entry equilibrintm (the
competitive price) will exceed marginal cost by enough tojust cover an etrant's fixed costs;
the relevant measure of cost that defines the cotipetitive price is entrant's marginal cost,
or, equivalently, incumbent's average cost.
29 The markup varies with the elasticity of demand, not wit I the level of demand. It is
well known, for exatmple, that the profit-Inaxinlizing markup of price over marginal cost
for a monopolist is directly related to the inverse elasticity of' denmand. This result is
extended from monopoly to oligopoly industries in Tinoth F. Bresnahan, The Oligopoy
Solution Concept Is Identified, 10 ECON. L T'TtERS 87 (1982).
: Another way to make this point is to imagine plausible differences in the way a ftirm's
marketing executives would approach their task if tey are able to exercise tiarket power.
When demand stbstituttion or market coin)et iioi n(ttst rains firims fIomiI raising price above
the competitive level, marketing executives are likely to conceive of their function solely in
1992]
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The example shows that the extent to which an industry exercises
market power can be measured by observing the effect on price of a
change in the elasticity of industry demand, so long as costs do not
change. If costs are known not to vary with Volume or over time (and if
other aspects of industry structure such as the number of firms and entry
conditions do not change over time), the most plausible explanation for
any observed variation in the market price is that the demand elasticity
has altered while firms are exercising market power. But if costs may
vary with volume or over time, price variation may have an explanation
other than the exercise of market power. For example, higher prices may
result from an increase in the cost of important inputs into aluminum
production such as bauxite, electricity, or labor. Or demand may have
increased, leading to higher prices without the exercise of market power
if' costs increase as production volume rises. These events could occur
simultaneously with demand growing more inelastic. So price increases
cannot be attributed to the exercise of market power, even if price rises
at the same time demand grows more inelastic, unless the possibility of
variable cost increases is taken into account.
Controlling for cost variation is thus the primary econometric problem
raised by the class of methodologies that infers market power from the
price response to variations in the elasticity of market demand. Given the
technology of aluminum production, cost is largely invariant to output
fluctuations that fall short of hitting capacity constraints, but marginal
cost becomes very high when firm output reaches capacity. This phenom-
enon makes it easy to confuse market power and high marginal cost
explanations for price rises if" demand simultaneously increases (to ap-
proach capacity) and becomes more inelastic (facilitating the exercise of
market power). "
Accounting measures of cost are not helpful in discriminating between
these explanations for price increases because accounting cost measures
do not rise sharply when capacity becomes constrained. But the output
response to variables that increase demand changes dramatically when
capacity constraints are reached. This observation was exploited by one
leIills of cost-based or corn pet itor-based pricing. But when firms are able to take advantage
of more inelastic demand by raising price, marketing executives are likely also to consider
customer value in making pricing decisions, and to speak in additioni of valoe-of-service
pricing.
" Firms can exercise market power only when o0tll fllIs ShOrt of capacity; if demiaid
exceeds capacity and firms produce to tbe limit, the market price is determined by the way
demand rations a fixed supply and not by the exercise ofimarket power.
[Vol. 61
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study of market power in the aluminum industry to exclude fr-om the
analysis periods during which capacity was constrained.
C. EMPIRICAL METHoDs BASED ON DETECTING
MULTIPLE PRICING REGIMES
The final class of new statistical tools for identifying and measuring
market power relies on the idea that firms may behave differently when
cooperating than when they compete. If firms are always cooperating or
always competing in the data we are able to observe-if there is no
variation in their behavior-these methods cannot be employed. Indeed,
many economic models of coordinated behavior imply stable cartel pric-
ing; under such circumstances, methods based on the detection of multi-
pie regimes will not be useful. But other models of coordinated behavior
suggest that when firms cannot perfectly monitor rival actions, the degree
of cooperation will vary across markets or over time.
Cooperation might be punctuated by occasional price wars, for exam-
ple, if firms cannot be certain whether unexpected declines in the market
price reflect rivals' cheating rather than unexpected declines in market
demand.3 :' The result that the degree of cooperation may vary over time
also requires that firms lack any other information fron which rival
cheating can be identified: the firms cannot, for example, observe the
output of their rivals. Under such circumstances, one might suppose that
coordinated behavior would be impossible. When firms observing an
unexpected decline in the market price caniot be confident that cheating
rather than an unexpected decline in demand is the cause, they may be
unwilling to engage in costly punishment behaviorH Recognizing this,
each firm will have an incentive to take advantage of the uncertainty to
steal their rivals' business through cheating while their rivals are puzzling
over the cause of the resulting decline in the market price.
12 These periods were identified through application of a methodology for detecting
multiple regimes, similar to those described in Section I II.C. Bresnahan & Suslow, sup a
note 25. Had marginal cost risen on the approach to capacity constraints, this methodology
could not have been employed. To distinguish cost fiom market power explanations for
price increases, it was also necessary to control or fIlucttiations in the price of key inputs.
:" This description of the relevant economic theory is a loose adaptation of Edward J.
Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Impefect Price Inirmation, 52
ECONOMETRICA 87 (1984).
o This theory focuses upon unexpected changes in price rather than predictable price
variation. If a price decline were to occur coincident with an observable decline in demand
(an economy-wide recession, perhaps), inlustI V members woIld correctly conclude that it
did not result from rival cheating antd, thts, that it does not threaten the stability of their
cartel.
1992]
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Contrary to the above supposition, some coordination is in fact possible
in this setting. To make coordination work, the firms must engage in a
price war whenever price falls unexpectedly, without pausing to identify
the cause; they must "shoot first and ask questions later." After a short-
term price war, the firms will return to the high price equilibrium. No
firm will find cheating worthwhile because such behavior will automati-
cally trigger a competitive response by its rivals. But price wars will occur
on occasion, whenever demand declines unexpectedly.
The empirical significance of this model is its prediction of multiple
pricing regimes. Much of the time, the firms will be engaged in supracom-
petitive pricing, but on occasion price wars will occur. Industry partici-
pants would likely recognize that their industry is susceptible to price
wars. For example, industry participants might decry in the trade press
the sudden breakdown in prices. They might call for industrial statesman-
ship in maintaining output and pricing discipline, with such comments
followed by increasing prices shortly thereafter.
The third class of econometric techniques for measuring market power
works by asking whether the data are better explained by two regimes-
two types of behavior-rather than one. In the academic literature
involving these techniques, the two regimes are typically cooperative
pricing and occasional price wars, as suggested by the economic model
described above.:" Similar techniques have also been used to identify the
members of a bidding ring in an auction setting in which some firms did
not participate in the price-fixing arrangement.,,
Several academic studies that identify market power by detecting multi-
pie pricing regimes investigate the behavior of certain midwestern rail-
roads during the 1880s, before the Sherman Act prohibited cartels or
the Interstate Commerce Commission set rail fares., The trade press of
that era recognized that the industry was prone to short but steep price
wars. The studies demonstrate that this pricing behavior is consistent
:5 More technically, these techniques ask whether the regression errors are better under-
stood as one normally distril)uted variale (hence one regime) or as the combination of two
such variables (hence two regimes).
"' Robert H. Porter, On the Incidence and Duration of Price Wars, 33 J. INDUS. EcoN. 415
(1985); Robert H. Porter, A Study of Cartel Stabilit: l'heJoint Executive Committee, 1880-1886,
14 BELLJ. ECON. 301 (1983); Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Cartel Policing Under Uncertainty:
The U.S. Steel lndustiy 1933-1939, 32 J.L. & EcoN. S47 (No. 2, Pt. 2 1989); Robert J. Town,
Price Wars and Demand Fluctuations: A Reexamination of the joint Executive Committee
(Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper 91-5, Departnet ofl ustice 1991).
:" Robert H. Porter &J. Douglas Zona, Deiection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions
(NBER Working Paper No. 4013, March 1992).
:" Porter, On the Incidence and Duration of Price Ways, supra note 36; Porter, A Study of
Cartel Stability, supra note 36; Town, supra note 36.
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with cartel behavior under incomplete monitoring, where the degree of
cooperation varies over time in response to unexpected changes in cost
or demand.
The primary inferential problem raised by this methodology is in
demonstrating that when multiple pricing regimes are observed, coordi-
nation is the explanation. In principle, after all, high and low price
regimes could be explained by other factors, such as the output of some
or all firms rising to capacity. One academic article attempts to accomplish
this by showing that unexpected demand declines, unrelated to observ-
able changes in the business cycle or the price of substitutes, led firmls to
act more competitively for a time. ) ' Not only was there a high-price
regime and a low-price regime, the regimes switched for a reason con-
nected with the theory. This result suggests that the firms were jointly
exercising market power when prices were high, although in the study
the difference in prices between the two regimes was not large.
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
With the invention of these new econometric tools for identifying and
measuring market power, antitrust can aspire to more precise analyses
of the competitive effects of business practices than ever before. These
statistical tools provide evidence on the extent of market power that
complements what can be inferred from market concentration.
Three classes of statistical methodologies have been described, each
based on a different conceptual experiment: cost variation, demand
elasticity variation, and the detection of multiple types of behavior. These
methodologies are unbiased: they neither favor plaintiffs nor defendants.
They have been employed by private litigants and the federal enforce-
ment agencies. Moreover, they often provide, as a byproduct, an estimate
of the cost to buyers of the exercise of market power by sellers.
As with other approaches to identifying market power, these tools are
not perfect. They typically require a great deal of data.'" Perhaps for this
reason, they have most often been employed in antitrust enforcement
in studies involving branded consumer products, where point-of-sale
scanner data are often available. In addition, there are typically a ntumber
'"Baker, supra note 36.
Data availability is not just a matter of the number of observations on the variables of
interest, although that factor is important. If the data does not contain within it examples
of the conceptual experiment addressed by the methodology, the econometric tool will not
permit market power to be measured. For this reason, no statistical methodology can
account for the effects of, for example, changes in market strucLIn re, Ol pr ices of inputs
and substitutes vastly different from those currently seen, unless similar sitlatiols thai
have occurred in the past appear in the data.
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of reasonable alternatives that an expert might adopt in applying any
specific econometric approach to analyze the data in a particular industry,
and results might vary significantly across alternative specifications. Two
expert economists could have different views as to the reasonableness of
the alternatives, and could in consequence interpret the same set of
statistical studies differently. This possibility may lead to an econometrics
tournament among competing experts, comparable in scope and signifi-
cance to the battle over market definition that often arises when the
traditional market share approach to inferring market power is employed
in an adversarial setting.
The choice of econometric methodology itself may be a difficult one.
It will depend on data availability and quality, on the structure of the
particular industry Under study, and on the very legal question that the
statistical work seeks to answer. Moreover, the difficulties of preparing
an expert witness to support statistical work under cross-examination are
well known. Perhaps for this reason, these methodologies have most
often been employed in merger review, where the decision-maker is an
antitrust enforcement agency rather than a court.
Because market power is a central concept in antitrust, the develop-
ment of new approaches to its identification is important news. These
econometric methodologies are already well-established among academic
economists. Antitrust lawyers today may not have done all they can for
their clients unless they investigate what such econometric methods imply
about the market power of the firms and industries they represent.
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